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The Federal Loyalty Program: Politics
and Civil Liberty
Felix Rackow
INTRODUCTION
In this post World War II period it is increasingly evident that the
East is taking advantage of the weaknesses of the Western nations by uti-
lizing political and economic pressure tactics as well as military force.
One of the most effective methods of applying such pressure is that of
subversive activity. The ability to control subversive activity and thereby
resist one form of political and economic pressure is as much a sign of
national strength as the ability
to resist military force.
THE An mOR (B.S., M.A., Ph.D., Cornell Uni- Controlling subversive ac-
versity) is Assistant Professor of Political Sci v
ence, Western Reserve University. tivity in democratic countries
presents a two-sided problem.
On the one hand, the demo-
cratic creed and procedures invite internal subversion. Free speech, the
right to assemble, and the right to move about the country without first
obtaining a permit from the police provide a favorable environment for
those who wish to engage in disloyal acts. On the other hand, demo-
cratic countries would be defeating their own objectives if they resorted to
totalitarian techniques in their attempt to curb internal subversion.
The scope of this paper will be limited to an examination of this basic
democratic dilemma as it has been manifested in the federal governments
civilian employee loyalty-security program.1 The thesis of this paper is that
the federal loyalty program has become so intertwined with narrow parti-
san politics that traditional American values in general and civil liberties
in particular have been endangered. The program will be examined
1. "There are now several personnel security programs. One is the program for Federal
civilian employees under Executive Order 10450, which is applicable to 2,300,000 persons.
A second is the Industrial Security Program of the Department of Defense. It covers the
nearly 3,000,000 persons who, as employees of contractors with the military departments, have
access to classified information. A third program is that of the Atomic Energy Commission,
which extends to its own employees and to those of its contractors' employees who have access
to classified information. They come to about 80,000 persons. Then there is the Port Se-
curity Program which applies to about 800,000 seamen and longshoremen. Finally, there is
the International Organization Employees Program which extends to over 3,000 Americans
in the employ of these organizations." REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMN HE ON THE FED-
ERAL LOYALTY-SEcURrY PROGRAM OF THE AsSOcrATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK 4 (1956). This brief report on the Eisenhower loyalty program is here presented
to show the breadth of the loyalty program under one administration. This paper, however,
will be concerned with only the first type of program mentioned in the report, the federal
civilian employee loyalty-security program. And the scope of its examination will not be
confined merely to the Eisenhower period but will include the years from 1939 to the present.
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during three specific periods: the period beginning in 1938 and ending
during the spring of 1947; the period between the spring of 1947 and
the close of President Truman's administration in 1952; and the period
beginning with President Eisenhower's administration to the present.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Although the history of the civilian employee loyalty-security pro-
gram now in operation is generally considered to have begun with the
Hatch Act in 1939,2 executive and legislative concern with the problem
of loyalty appeared during both the Revolutionary and Civil Wars.3 Dur-
ing these two wars tens of thousands of Americans were involved in loyal-
ty controversies.' At the time of the American Revolution, there was
anxiety in the Continental Congress over loyalist activities in the South
and in some northeastern strongholds of Toryism, such as New York.'
In 1776 Congress made up a list of persons who were declared to be out-
side the protection of the United Colonies and forbade trade and inter-
course with those listed.' In 1778 Congress established a loyalty test to
be administered to all civil and military officers in order to "prevent per-
sons disaffected to the interest of the United States from being employed
in any of the important offices thereof."7 This loyalty test was ultimately
considered a failure, for American traitors of the time had been fully
sworn to loyalty by its formula.'
In the Civil War, loyalty-testing occurred both in the North and the
South? "Loyalty was a factor in the lives of millions, second only to
the paramount fact of the war itself."'" In the South no loyalty tests
were developed other than those imposed by the local police." In the
North, however, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus soon after
the war began, and Northern police and army officials arrested hundreds
of suspected civilians on the general charge of disloyalty. 2 Government
employees were required to re-swear their oaths of allegiance, 3 and each
2. Hatch Political Activity Act, 53 Star. 1148 (1939), 5 U.S.C. § 118(i) (1952) [herein-
after referred to as the Hatch Act].
3. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SouLs 23-61, 139-219 (1959).
4. Id. at 329.
5. Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution, 3 ILL. L. Rzv.
81 (1908).
6. Id. at 86.
7. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SOULS 82 (1959).
8. Id. at 84.
9. Id. at 139.
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 139.
12. Id. at 140.
13. Id. at 154.
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cabinet officer was given discretion to add to the oath requirements 4
Federal employees who refused to swear to such oaths were denied their
salaries. 5  Those dismissed for disloyalty usually went to jail.'" More-
over, there was no rule or standard providing the accused employees with
the opportunity to seek redress. If an employee could not convince the
bureau head or other high official of his loyalty, he was without remedy,
for there was no appeal to the courts.'
The ultimate rationale for the rigorous program of military arrests
and detention was made by Lincoln himself in 1863:
The military arrests and detentions ... have been for prevention, and
not for punishment as injunctions, to stay injury, as proceedings to keep
the peace - and hence,.., they have not been accompanied with indict-
ment, or trials by juries, nor in a single case by any punishment what-
ever, beyond what is purely incidental to the prevention.' 8
The same rationale of "prevention" could be made to justify the arbitrary
dismissal of federal employees.
Between 1865 and the beginning of World War I the national inter-
est did not call for a federal loyalty program or for the investigation of
subversive conduct on the part of federal employees. In fact, Civil Ser-
vice Rule VIII forbade questions calling "for the expression or disclosure
of any political... opinion or affiliation, and if such opinion or affilia-
tion be known, no discrimination shall be made by reason thereof by the
examiners, the Commission or the appointing power."'" Character ex-
aminations were made by the Civil Service Commission, but loyalty was
presumed if character was found to be good.20 Indeed, the very purpose
behind the adoption of the Civil Service Act in 1883 was to exclude the
personal and political beliefs of an applicantf' This policy was main-
tained without any significant breach until World War I.
During World War I there were more than 2,500 indictments under
security statutes, mostly under the Espionage and Sedition Acts.22 There
was also a specific federal loyalty-employment program.23 Like Lincoln,
Wilson insisted on executive leadership of the war effort despite the de-
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Id. at 155.
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 141.
19. Civil Service Act, 22 Star. 403 (1883), 5 U.S.C. §§ 632, 633, 635, 637, 638, 640, 642(1958).
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217 (1917); Sedition Act, 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
23. HYmAN, To TRY MAN'S SouLs 268, 329 (1959).
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mands of Congress for control.24 Four days after war was declared, Wil-
son obtained authority from Congress to establish loyalty standards for
all civil servants.2" Under this authority the Civil Service Commission
assumed the power to refuse all applications for employment "if there
was a reasonable belief that appointment was inimical to the public in-
terest owing to lack of loyalty."26  A total of 135 loyalty investigations
were conducted in 1917, and 2,537 in 1918.27 There were 660 dis-
missals.28 However, only a small percentage of the total number of fed-
eral workers were actually affected by this program.29 There were many
agencies not under commission control,"0 and federal departments em-
ployed tens of thousands of workers outside civil service procedures.3
Thus, the program was only partially effective.
Subsequent to World War I, government workers were protected
against removal from their positions without explanation by the proce-
dural provisions of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act32 and the Veterans' Prefer-
ence Act.3  Under the former act, classified service employees could
only be dismissed to promote the efficiency of the service. Although
the Act provided that "no witness nor any trial or hearing shall be re-
quired except in the discretion of the officer making the removal,"8 it
did require that prior to dismissal the employee be presented with a writ-
ten statement of the charges against him and be given a reasonable time
in which to answer the charges in writing. 6 The Veterans' Preference
Act provided that preference eligibles be given thirty days in which to
reply to charges,3" and provided further that the charges themselves must
state "any and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for any such proposed
action.""3 Although these acts are still in effect today, the extent of their
coverage has been modified both by executive order and legislative en-
actment.39
24. Id. at 268.
25. Ibid.
26. Id. at 269.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. 37 Stat. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1952) thereinafter referred to as the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act].
33. 58 Star. 390 (1949), 5 U.S.C. 863 (1952).
34. Lloyd-LaFollette Act § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. § 652(a) (1952).
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. 58 Stat. 390 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1952).
38. Ibid.
39. See discussion in text infra.
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1938 TO 1947: THE DIES COMMITTEE
In 1938 Congressman Martin Dies used the House Committee on
Un-Amerian Activities (of which he was chairman) as "the forum for his
attack on Government employees as Communists or Communist sympa-
thizers."4 The year 1938 also marked the adoption of the united front
policy by world communism,4 and Communists the world over joined
forces with reformers and liberals to work for common objectives.4" For
example, if liberals were to work for a policy of no discrimination in em-
ployment, then the Communists were to join their movement and work
with them. Perhaps this united front policy of the Communists added to
the difficulties Congressmen Dies encountered when he attempted to
make a distinction between liberals and Communists. Furthermore, as
he was unable to obtain lists of Communist Party members, Dies simply
lumped Communists and reformers together, implying that if one Com-
munist was in an organization, then all others in the group must be either
Communists or Communist sympathizers.43
The adoption of such a policy was not without political motivation.
In 1939 Earl Browder, onetime National Chairman of the Communist
Party in America, testified before the Dies Committee to the effect that
any group which the Communists even attempted to infiltrate could be
called a "transmission belt" for subversive information to Moscow.44
Thereafter the Committee read into the record the names of Roosevelt
cabinet members and other high officials "who had sent greetings to or
spoken before meetings of these groups."45  Under the circumstances, it
is not surprising that:
... the result of these proceedings was to implant firmly in the minds of
the members of the Roosevelt Administration and of liberals throughout
the country the conviction that the purposes of the Dies Committee were
chiefly political and had little to do with a genuine search for subver-
sion but much with partisan attack upon the Administration.
Although unable to convince the administration that a problem of
subversion existed, Dies was able to get some support from Congress in
the form of the Hatch Act passed in 1939.4Y The Hatch Act was de-
signed primarily to control corrupt politics in the civil service by forbid-
ding government employees from engaging in politics. The Act was
40. BONTEcOU, THE FEDERAL LoYALTY-SEcuiTy PROGRAM 8 (1953). See also Emer-
son & Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government Employees, 58 YALE L. J. 1 (1948).
41. BONTEcou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SEcuRITY PROGRAM 8 (1953)..
42. Ibid.
43. GELLERmAN,M ARTIN DiEs 102, 103 (1944).
44. OGDEN, THE DiEs CommrmE 135, 136 (1945).
45. BoNTEcou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SEcURITY PROGRAM 8, 9 (1953).
46. Id. at 9.
47. 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), 5 U.S.C. § 118(i) (1952).
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amended from the floor to include section 9-A, which forbade the em-
ployment of any person who was currently a member of "any political
party or organization which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional
form of government.""8 At this time Congress also passed a rider to the
appropriation bill for the Emergency Cargo Ship Construction Act which
forbade the use of monies appropriated "to pay the salary or wages of any
person who advocates, or who is a member of an organization that ad-
vocates, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force
or violence."49 Similar language has been incorporated in subsequent ap-
propriation acts. Congress also enacted legislation permitting the so-
called secret agencies to dismiss suspected employees without going
through the regular civil service procedures.5"
These statutes compelled executive action with regard to a loyalty
program. Under presidential authority, the task of keeping subversives
out of the government rested with the Civil Service Commission in so far
as new applicants were concerned.51 All applicants were to fill out a
long questionnaire; if facts of a suspicious nature were uncovered, a de-
tailed investigation was ordered.52 The Commission also issued Circular
No. 222 on June 20, 1940, by which members of "the Communist Party,
the German Bund, or any other Communist, Nazi or Fascist organization"
could be removed by agency heads under Rule 12, which permitted re-
movals "to promote the efficiency of the service.""3
The task of finding subversives among those already employed was
delegated to each of the agencies of the government.54 Upon the request
of an agency, the Department of Justice conducted investigations, but
keeping within the terms of section 9-A of the Hatch Act and the ap-
propriation bill rider, the department limited its reports to a determina-
tion of membership in an organization which advocated the overthrow
of the government.55
The Attorney General cooperated with the Dies committee as well as
with agency heads in expediting loyalty cases.5 Dies submitted to the
Attorney General a list of 1,121 names of persons who he said were dis-
loyal.57 But out of this long list, only two were ultimately dismissed.5"
48. 53 Star. 1148 (1939), 5 U.S.C. § 118(j) (1952).
49. 55 Stat. 5 (1941), 46 U.S.C. § 1119(a) (1958).
50. 54 Star. 713 (1940).
51. Civil Service War Service Regulations, 7 Fed. Reg. 7723 (1942).
52. Ibid.
53. Quoted in BoNTEcou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM 285-87 (1953).
54. Emerson & Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government Employees, 58 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (1948).
55. Id. at 16.
56. Letter from the Attorney General, H.R. Doc. No. 833, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1942).
57. BONTECOU, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECuRITY PROGRAM 10 (1953).
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To Congress, the final action taken on the Dies Committee list seemed
like a whitewash for the benefit of the Executive.59
On February 5, 1943, President Roosevelt further implemented the
loyalty program when he issued Executive Order 9300, "Establishing the
President's Interdepartmental Committee within the Department of Jus-
tice to Advise the Agencies in Connection with Complaints of Subversive
Activities on the Part of Government Employees."6  This interdepart-
mental committee also defined subversive activity in terms of the defini-
tion contained within the Hatch Act. 1 It set up a procedure for the De-
partment of Justice and the agencies to follow in their investigations, cir-
culated instructions on the use of the FBI reports that were given to the
agencies when they requested them, and acted as a review board. 2
However, Congressman Dies remained dissatisfied with the response
of the Administration. He charged the President with glossing over the
Communist menace in that findings of disloyalty were not made in regard
to all of the names submitted to the Attorney General." Dies this time
turned to Congress.
On February 1, 1943, Dies spoke in Congress for two hours charging
that thirty-nine federal employees were "irresponsible, unrepresentative,
crackpot, radical bureaucrats" and were members of "communist front
organizations" as well." He daimed that all thirty-nine persons were,
at that time, working for the Treasury and Post Office Departments, and
he urged that the House pass a rider to the Treasury-Post Office Appro-
priation Bill, then under consideration, to the effect that none of the
monies appropriated be used to pay the salaries of the thirty-nine em-
ployees. 5 However, it was discovered that of the thirty-nine only one
was employed by either of the two departments he had designated, and
58. H.R. Doc. No. 833, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1942).
59. Testimony of Arthur Fleming, Hearings on the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill
for 1945 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1082 (1944).
60. 8 Fed. Reg. 1701 (1943).
61. Section 9(A) of the Hatch Act, 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), 5 U.S.C. § 118(j) (1952),
referred to those having "membership in any political party or organization which advocates
the overthrow of our constitutional form of government .. ." Bontecou points out that the
interdepartmental committee "... limited its work to cases in which there was credible evidence
of membership in organizations authoritatively held to be subversive or of personal advocacy
by the accused employee of the overthrow of the Government by force and violence. The
committee recognized that other matters which would warrant discharge of an employee, in-
cluding primary allegiance to a foreign power, might be uncovered by the investigation. It
concluded that these matters were not covered by the Hatch Act and must be dealt with directly
by the employing agency since they were outside the province of the Interdepartmental Com-
mittee." BoNTEcou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SEcURITY PROGRAM 19 (1953).
62. Exec. Order No. 9300 § 9, 8 Fed. Reg. 1701 (1943).
63. H.R. REP. No. 2748, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-16 (1943).
64. 89 CoNG. Ic. 474, 486 (1943).
65. 89 CONG. REQc 486 (1943).
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this one was a Negro.66 Among other charges, one of discrimination was
raised against Dies.67 As a result, the House passed a resolution author-
izing the Appropriations Committee to establish a subcommittee under
the chairmanship of Congressman Kerr to examine the charges."
Instead of submitting all thirty-nine cases to the Kerr subcommittee,
Dies gave it only nine names.69 Of these, the subcommittee found only
three men to be guilty of "subversive activity within the definition
adopted by the Committee. ''70 Section 304 was then added as an amend-
ment to the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, prohibiting
the payment of salaries to the three men after November 15, 1943, unless
prior to that date they were again appointed to their jobs by the President
with the consent of the Senate. 7' The President reluctantly signed the
Act, because passage of this legislation was urgently needed for the war
effort.72 The three men were, however, retained by the agencies as
neither the agencies nor the President desired their dismissal.7' There-
after, the three men, Lovett, Watson, and Dodd, brought suit in the
Court of Claims for compensation for the time worked subsequent to
November 15, 1943.74 They contended that section 304 was unconstitu-
tional as a bill of attainder, as an interference by the legislative branch
with the authority of the executive, and as a denial of due process under
the fifth amendment. After the Solicitor General joined the dismissed
employees in the first two of these contentions, Congress appointed a
special counsel to appear on its behalf. The argument of Congress was
that section 304 was a valid exercise of Congressional authority under its
power to lay and collect taxes, that it involved simply an exercise of con-
gressional powers over appropriations which were not subject to judicial
review, and that no justiciable controversy had been raised. The Court
66. William Pickens was the only Negro whom Dies named in his two hour indictment of
February 1, 1943. 89 CONG. REc. 474-83 (1943). On February 8, Dies spoke of Pickens
again, charging him with perjury. 89 CONG. REc. 698-701 (1943). At the conclusion of
Dies' attack Representative Knutson rose to his feet charging Dies with racial discrimination.
89 CONG. REC. 702 (1943). Three days previously the House had voted to exclude only
Pickens from employment, by means of a House appropriations bill. 89 CONG. REc. 657
(1943). Knutson brought an indictment against the entire House: "[w]hen the name of
this man Pickens came up, a colored man, a descendant from people who were brought here
in chains and against their will, brought here in servitude, this great body singled out a poor
colored man for punishment and practically gave what amounts to a whitewash to the 37
white companions who were equally or more guilty. My God, that is almost lynch law." 89
CONG. REc. 702 (1943).
67. See note 66 supra.
68. 89 CONG. REC. 709 (1943) (remarks of Representative Cannon).
69. See OGDEN, THE DIES COMMrTTEE 275-76 (1945).
70. H.R. REP. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
71. Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943).
72. See United States v. Lovert, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946).
73. Id. at 305, 313.
74. Id. at 305.
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of Claims held against Congress.75 On certiorari, the Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed.76 The Court held that section 304 was not
merely an appropriations measure or "a mere stoppage of the disbursing
routine,,77 but was in fact a permanent bar from federal employment
and thus presented a justiciable controversy. The Court said that the
employees' contracts with the government were actually breached, and,
therefore, section 304 of the Appropriation Act was subject to judicial
review.
Then the Court considered some of the constitutional questions raised
in the Court of Claims, although it managed to avoid the issues of separa-
tion of powers and due process. Instead, the Court found that section 304
operated as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion and as such was a
punishment of named individuals without a trial. The Court held section
304 to be a bill of attainder prohibited by the Constitution.
Since section 304 was held to be a bill of attainder, it was not neces-
sary to decide whether it also constituted an interference by the legisla-
tive branch with the authority of the executive branch. The effect of the
decision was, however, to prohibit interference of this nature. The Court
also stated that "section 304 ... does not stand as an obstacle to payment
of compensation to Lovett, Watson and Dodd.""s Compensation was the
only relief asked for by these employees; they had not brought suit for
reinstatement. Had the dismissed employees sought and been granted
reinstatement, the significance of a decision in their favor as an effective
bar against legislative interference with the authority of the executive
would have been even stronger. In reality, the Court had resolved on
narrow constitutional grounds (bill of attainder) a question of far-reach-
ing import involving the relationship of the executive and legislative
branches. As for Congressman Dies, the Supreme Court's decision should
have led many to believe that he had used the term "subversive" as a
weapon in his fight with those who held political views different from
his own.
The World War II phase of the federal loyalty program may be con-
sidered to have ended on November 25, 1946, when President Truman
issued Executive Order 9806 which created the President's Temporary
Commission on Employee Loyalty to review the effectiveness of the ad-
ministration's loyalty program.79 At that time the President determined
that the government security program lacked uniformity in administra-
75. Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142 (Ct. CL 1945).
76. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
77. Id. at 313.
78. Id. at 318.
79. Exec. Order No. 9806, 11 Fed. Reg. 13863 (1946).
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tion because each agency followed its own procedure."s In retrospect it
appears that the President's concern for uniformity of standards revealed
a broader concern for a fair and effective loyalty program. The Presi-
dent later wrote:
It is one of the tragedies of our time that the security program of the
U.S. has been wickedly used by demagogues and sensational newspapers
in an attempt to frighten and mislead the American people. . . . The
McCarthys, the McCarrans, the Jenners, the Parnell Thomases, the Veldes
have waged a relentless attack, raising doubts in the minds of people
about the loyalty of most employees in government... 81
President Truman wanted to create a new and intelligent loyalty pro-
gram which would meet the increased Soviet threat and which would at
the same time restore the confidence of the country in the government
and the government employee.8 2 Subsequent events would prove how
successful he was in achieving these two goals.
1947 TO 1952: THE TRUMAN LOYALTY PROGRAM
Executive Order 9835, issued by President Truman on March 21,
1947, established the first comprehensive loyalty program for federal
employees.8" The basic provisions of the executive order including those
recommended by the Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty,"
were as follows:
(1) All applicants for government jobs were to be screened by the
Civil Service Commission.
(2) Those already employed by the government were to be screened
by the agency for which they worked.
(3) When these initial investigations turned up derogatory informa-
tion, full field investigations were to be instituted, with the help
of the FBI.
(4) Applicants for certain sensitive positions were to be given full
field investigations automatically.
(5) Agency heads were given the responsibility for weeding out the
disloyal. (Ultimately some 150 loyalty boards were established in
the various agencies.)
(6) Accused persons were entitled to a hearing before the board at
which they were permitted counsel, they were permitted to pro-
duce witnesses and affidavits, and were to be notified in writing
of the charges against them.
(7) The Civil Service Commission was to establish a Loyalty Review
Board superior to the agency boards; the accused had the right to
appeal to it.
80. 2 TRUMAN, MEMOIRS 279 (1956).
81. Id. at 284.
82. KOENIG, THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION: ITS PRINCIPLES AND PRACrIcE 59 (1956).
83. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947).
84. BoNTEcou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PRoGRAm 26 (1953).
[September
FEDERAL LOYALTY PROGRAM
This program was modified somewhat by Congress in 1950.5 Until
that year President Truman had sought a middle ground. He had at-
tempted to remove the loyalty program from politics and had appointed
prominent Republicans to the Loyalty Review Board and to investigating
committees.8 6 He had tried to guarantee the loyalty of the government
worker to the public and in so doing had resisted attacks from both the
House and Senate - he had even gone so far as to refuse to turn over
his records to the House Un-American Activities Committee." Neverthe-
less, pressures from the conservatives in Congress and the changed politi-
cal climate brought about by the Korean War resulted in legislation
modifying the Truman loyalty-security program."8
The Act of August 26, 1950, Public Law 733 of the 81st Congress,
authorized a summary suspension of those employees working in some
eleven "sensitive" agencies who were considered by the agency heads to
endanger "national security." 9  With regard to suspensions under this
law there was no right to a hearing nor to an appeal" although provision
was made for a hearing prior to dismissal at the discretion of the agency.0
Furthermore, section 3 authorized the President to extend the list of sensi-
tive agencies, from time to time, when necessary in the best interests of
national security."
The basic standard of Executive Order 9835 used to determine dis-
loyalty was that "on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for the
belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the
United States."93 This standard was amended on April 28, 1951 by Ex-
ecutive Order 10241." ' The same pressures which had brought about the
enactment of Public Law 733 were forceful enough now to require a
stricter and more rigorous standard in the executive order itself.95 As
amended, the standard to be applied was whether, "on all the evidence,
85. 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. S5 22-1 - 22-3 (1952). [Hereinafter referred
to as Public Law 733). This act gave authority to eleven sensitive agencies to suspend sum-
marily employees who were considered by these agencies to endanger national security.
86. 2 TRUMAN, MEMOmS 290 (1956).
87. KoENIG, THE TRumAN ADMS TION: ITS PRINCIPLES AND PRACTIcE 59, 63
(1956).
88. See debate in the House of Representatives, 96 CoNG. REc. 10015-36 (1950).
89. 64 Star. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 - 22-3 (1952). The following agencies were
considered sensitive: Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice,
Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of
the Air Force, Coast Guard, Atomic Energy Commission, National Security Resources Board,
and National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
90. Public Law 733, 5 1, 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. 5 22-1 (1952).
91. Ibid.
92. Public aw 733, § 3, 64 Star. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-3 (1952).
93. Exec. Order No. 9835, Pt. V (1), 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, 1938 (1947) (emphasis added).
94. Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690 (1951).
95. See note 92 suPra.
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there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the
Government of the United States."96  The distinction in the application
of these two standards was clarified in Service v. Dulles.97
John S. Service, a career Foreign Service Officer, was accorded suc-
cessive clearances in the years 1945, 1946, 1947, and 1949 by the State
Department's Loyalty Review Board. However, in 1950 the Loyalty Re-
view Board of the Civil Service Commission ordered a post-audit under
the more stringent "reasonable doubt" standard of Executive Order 10241
and, after a hearing, found that there was reasonable doubt as to his loy-
alty." Thus, Service was discharged by Secretary of State Acheson as a
loyalty risk under the second executive standard whereas he had been
cleared under the first. Although later this dismissal was struck down
by the Supreme Court of the United States on other grounds, the appli-
cability of the two standards as discussed here was not questioned.9
Executive Order 9835 also provided that, in connection with the de-
termination of disloyalty, the administrative tribunal charged with the
execution of the program might take into consideration membership in
or affiliation with a group designated by the Attorney General as Com-
munist."' It was the practice of the Attorney General to list organiza-
tions found by him to be Communistic without giving such organizations
notice or hearing.'' The list was transmitted to the Loyalty Review
Board and disseminated by the Board to all government departments and
agencies for use in administrative proceedings under the program.'
The discharge of employees on grounds of disloyalty under Executive
Order 9835 was sustained against various constitutional objections in
Bailey v. Richardson.3 and in Washington v. McGrath... although the
government's informants did not appear either in person or by affidavit
and the administrative order was based on evidence not disclosed to the
employees charged. On the other hand, the organizations which, without
notice or hearing, were designated as Communist by the Attorney Gen-
eral and placed on his proscribed list, were held in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath.. to have standing to sue the Attorney
96. Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690 (1951) (emphasis added).
97. 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
98. Id. at 366.
99. The Court held that Service's discharge was in violation of the Loyalty and Security
Regulations of the Department of State and that the Secretary was bound by these Regulations.
100. Exec. Order No. 9835, Pt. V (2) (f), 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, 1938 (1947).
101. BONTEcOu, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM 37 (1953).
102. Exec. Order No. 9835, Pt. III (2), 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, 1938 (1947).
103. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided court with Mr. Justice Clark
not participating, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
104. 182 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided court with Mr. justice
Clark not participating, 341 U.S. 923 (1951).
105. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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General for the purpose of showing that they were not, in fact, -Com-
munist groups.
The Bailey case"08 defines the judicial approach to the constitutional
problem which regards the rights of the individual employee as opposed
to those of the group. Miss Bailey held membership in several organiza-
tions on the list of the Attorney General. Although she was permitted
to present witnesses in her behalf, she was not confronted with- specific
charges nor was she permitted to confront her accusers and cross-examine
them. Although the court invalidated her three-year bar from the fed-
eral service on the ground that it was a punishment applied to an individual
and thus subject to the rule in the Lovett case,"0 7 the-court denied that any
other constitutional right had been abridged:
It is our dear opinion that the President, absent Congressional restric-
tion, may remove from Government service any person of whose loyalty
he is not completely convinced. He may do so without assigning any
reason and without giving the employee a general description of the
information which concerns him and to hear what the employee has to
say; he does not thereby strip himself of any portion of his constitutional
power to choose and remove. 08
The rationale for this approach was as follows: since the President had
responsibility for the employee, the courts did not have the right to in-
tervene when the President dismissed a suspect employee, even if this re-
moval action caused injury to the employee. Nor could the employee
complain, for he did not have a right to federal employment; rather a
government job was a privilege held at the discretion of the executive.
Consequently, the court in the Bailey case denied that dismissal from gov-
ernment service on loyalty grounds was' a punishment requiring a jury
trial under the sixth amendment; denied that the due process clause of
the fifth amendment required specific charges to be made, or granted the
accused employee the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; and
denied that the first amendment bars discrimination against government
employees because of their political views.
The same constitutional issues involved in Bailey were again raised in
Peters v. Hobby, " but the Court rested its decision on other grounds.
Dr. Peters, a physician in the Public Health Service, had twice been
cleared by agency loyalty boards, first under the provisions of Executive
Order 9835 and later under the less favorable standard of Executive Order
10241. Nevertheless, the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service
106. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff' by an equally divided court
with Mr. Justice Clark not participating, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
107. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
108. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1959), affd by an equally divided
court with Mr. Justice Clark not participating, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
109. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
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Commission ordered a post-audit of his case, and as a result, Dr. Peters
was discharged. The Supreme Court of the United States ignored the
constitutional issues but refused to uphold the dismissal because of an
error on a procedural technicality.
Executive Order 9835 provided that the Loyalty Review Board should
have authority:
... to review cases involving persons recommended for dismissal on
grounds relating to loyalty by the loyalty board of any department or
agency and to make advisory recommendations thereon to the head of
the department or agency. Such cases may be referred to the Board
either by the employing department or agency, or by the officer or em-
ployee concerned. . . 110
The Court construed the executive order as authorizing an appeal from
the findings of an agency board to the Loyalty Review Board merely "for
an advisory recommendation.""' As the Loyalty Review Board ordered
the post-audit on its own motion and not when asked for a recommenda-
tion by either the agency or employee involved, the Court said the Loyalty
Review Board had no jurisdiction to order dismissal. The doctrines set
forth in the opinion in Bailey v. Richardson regarding the absence of
specific charges and the denial of the right to confront the accusers were
not questioned in Peters v. Hobby as they were not even considered.
Rather the decision in Peters v. Hobby rested on the ground of the Loyal-
ty Review Board's failure to comply with the literal terms of the Execu-
tive Order. Thus Bailey was still controlling, yet strict compliance with
the provisions of the Executive Order was now mandatory. The ag-
grieved employee's principal remedy lay in challenging his dismissal as
not complying with the Executive Order rather than in challenging the
entire dismissal proceedings on constitutional grounds.
The Truman loyalty program remained intact in the face of constitu-
tional challenge. In Bailey constitutional questions were subordinated to
the privilege doctrine of federal employment, and the broad removal pow-
ers of the executive were sustained. Peters merely required strict statu-
tory compliance. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,21
the right to a hearing was provided for those organizations proscribed by
the Attorney General. But federal employees still had no ground either
for challenging the black-listing of organizations or for proving the in-
nocence of their association with the blacklisted organizations.
Criticism of the Loyalty Program Under President Truman
Two major criticisms can be made of the loyalty program under
President Truman. The first involves the use of information that a fed-
110. Exec. Order No. 9835, Pt. III (1) (a), 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, 1938 (1947).
111. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 339 (1955).
112. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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eral employee was a member of one or more organizations proscribed by
the Attorney General. While membership in a proscribed organization
was theoretically not conclusive proof of disloyalty,"' the doctrine of
"guilt by association" did emerge in the implementation of the program.
Disloyalty was determined not only by the action and words of the federal
employee himself but also by the action and words of those with whom he
associated.
The second major criticism involves the burden of proof the accused
employee was required to sustain in demonstrating his loyalty. This bur-
den was all the more difficult to sustain when the employee was not per-
mitted to confront his accusers or was not even told who they were.
Often the members of the loyalty boards reviewing the case did not even
know who had made the original complaint -to the FBI investigators." 4
It should also be remembered that the members of the loyalty boards
themselves had to be cleared and that they were operating in an atmos-
phere charged with political -strife.
THE EISENHOWER PERIOD
During the last years of the Truman Administration the names of
Alger Hiss, Judith Coplon, Harry Dexter White and Owen Lattimore
became familiar to everyone who read the newspapers. The party which
had served for two decades as the loyal opposition now had found a po-
litical issue upon which it could pin its hope for victory in 1952 - the
Truman Administration was "soft" on Communism.
On February 7, 1950, the Republican members of the House and
Senate issued a statement on the loyalty program which was agreed to
by the Republican National Committee:
We denounce the soft attitude of this administration toward Govern-
ment employees and officials who hold or support Communist attitudes.
We pledge immediate action to bring about:
(A) The complete overhaul of the so-called loyalty and security
checks of Federal personnel.
(B) The prompt elimination of all Communists, fellow travelers
and Communist sympathizers from our Federal payroll.
(C) Closer coordination between our intelligence agencies, with
full use of the facilities of the FBI for protecting our security.",5
These principles were embraced by the Republican Party 1952 Campaign
Platform:
By the administration's appeasement of Communism at home and abroad
it has permitted Communists and their fellow travelers to serve in many
key agencies and to infiltrate our American life....
113. BoNTncou, Tm FnDmAL. LoYALTY-SEcURrry PROGRAM 32 (1953).
114. Id. at 60, 246 (1953).
115. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1950, p. 20, col. 8.
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A Republican President will appoint only persons of unquestioned
loyalty. We will overhaul loyalty and security programs .... 11'
Then on October 4, 1952, in a speech in Milwaukee, General Eisen-
hower endorsed the candidacy of Senator McCarthy, stating that although
there was a difference between himself and the Senator in method, their
goals were the same. Candidate Eisenhower, paraphrasing existing judi-
cial doctrine, added:
To work for the United States Government is a privilege, not a right.
And it is the prerogative of the Government to set the strictest test upon
the loyalty and the patriotism of those entrusted with our nation's
safety.1"
After the Republican victory, campaign pledges were quickly imple-
mented. On April 27, 1953, President Eisenhower issued Executive
Order 10450 which revoked President Truman's Executive Order 9835
and established a new and more rigorous loyalty program under the title,
"Security Requirements for Government Employment.""'  Executive
Order 10450 contained these basic innovations:
First, the standard of federal employment was changed from "reason-
able doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved""' 9 to that which re-
quires employment to be "clearly consistent with the interests of national
security."'2 0 This latter standard was borrowed from Public Law 733
which was embraced by Executive Order 10450.2'
Second, the summary suspension powers of Public Law 733 were ex-
tended to cover all of the federal agencies. This act authorized a sum-
mary suspension of those employees working in some eleven "sensitive"
agencies - those agencies whose activities directly concerned the national
security as opposed to those agencies whose activities concerned the gen-
eral health and welfare. 2 Section 3 of the Act authorized the President
to extend the list of sensitive agencies, from time to time, when necessary
in the best interests of national security.2 3  President Eisenhower thought
116. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1952, p. 8, col. 3.
117. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1952, p. 8, col. 5.
118. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
119. Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690 (1951).
120. Exec. Order No. 10450 § 2, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
121. Public Law 733, 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1952), provides that the
"agency head concerned may . . . terminate the employment of such suspended employee
whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of national
security .. ." Section 1 of Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953), provides
that: "In addition to the departments and agencies specified in the said act of August 26,
1950 . . . the provisions of that act shall apply to all other departments and agencies of the
Government."
122. See footnote 89 supra.
123. 64 Star. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-3 (1952).
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it necessary to make "the provisions of.the act apply to all other depart-
ments and agencies of the government."' 24
As a result of this executive action, which extended summary dismis-
sal procedures to all federal agencies, the distinction between the standard
of loyalty required by the general agencies and the standard of loyalty re-
quired by the sensitive agencies disappeared. The two different proce-
dures were replaced by a single standard and a single summary procedure.
Third, the term "security" rather than the term "loyalty" was used in
the Executive Order, and it was made all inclusive so as to embrace with-
in its scope a multitude of new sins as grounds for suspension or digmissal.
These included: unreliable behavior, activities, or associations; dcliberate
misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts; criminal,
infamous, dishonest, immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct; habitual
use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion; evidence
of mental disorder; and finally, any facts which furnish reasonable evi-
dence to indicate that an individual may be subject to coercion, influence,
or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of
national security. Also, continued from the Truman program as grounds
of dismissal, but now coming within the scope of the term "security,"
were espionage, treason, sedition, the advocacy of force and violence to
overthrow the government, and membership in or sympathy with an or-
ganization which is Fascist, Communist, totalitarian, or "subversive." In
addition, the intentional unauthorized disclosure of security information
and activities which aided another government in preference to the inter-
ests of the United States was continued as grounds for dismissal."m
Fourth, no public disclosure was to be made as to whether an em-
ployee had been discharged on the grounds of disloyalty or on one of the
other grounds now included in the category of "security risk."'
126
Finally, as the Loyalty Review Board was abolished, there was no
longer a right of appeal beyond the agency level - in contrast to the
Truman program where appeals were made from the agency directly to
the Loyalty Review Board.127  As a result, each agency head could make
his own interpretation of "security risk" and set his own standards for dis-
missal proceedings within the limits of Executive Order 10450. Simi-
larly, discretion was vested in each agency head to classify the degree of
sensitivity for each job in the agency.'28
124. Exec. Order No. 10450 § 1, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
125. Section 8 of Executive Order Number 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, 2491 (1953), lists
the grounds for dismissal.
126. Exec. Order No. 10450 § 9(c), 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, 2492 (1953).
127. Compare Exec. Order No. 10450 § 12, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, 2492 (1953) with Exec.
Order 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947).
128. Exec. Order No. 10450 § 3(b), 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
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The Numbers Game
Perhaps the most important criticism that can be made of the Eisen-
hower loyalty program concerns its deliberate failure to distinguish be-
tween an employee who was a security risk and one who was disloyal or
subversive. By enlarging the scope of the term "security risk" to include
activities other than those that were strictly subversive, Executive Order
10450 set the stage for a new political game. 2 '
On October 23, 1953, the White House announced that 1,456 em-
ployees had been released during the first four months of the Administra-
tion's Federal Employee Security Program.' On January 7, 1954, in
his State of the Union message President Eisenhower stated that "under
the standards established for the new employee security program, more
than 2,200 employees have been separated from the Federal govern-
ment."' 1  In the very next paragraph, he spoke about the "subversive
character of the Communist Party in the United States."'132 On October
11, 1954, the Civil Service Commission announced that 6,926 persons
had been dismissed between May 28, 1953 and June 30, 1954 as security
risks or had resigned with derogatory information in their files; of these,
1,743 were subversives.1
33
While President Eisenhower may have been referring to security risks
and not to persons who were disloyal, he was not very explicit on this
point. Meanwhile, other Republican leaders - such as Attorney Gen-
eral Herbert Brownell, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, and National Re-
publican Chairman Leonard Hall all spoke in terms which equated se-
curity risks with subversives and persons who were disloyal.1'3  Thus,
high ranking members of the Administration were, in effect, confusing
the public so that it would believe that a federal employee had been dis-
missed on grounds of disloyalty when in reality he had been discharged
on some other ground. This confusion was further compounded by the
fact that when President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10450 was re-
leased, it was asserted that there would be no public statement made re-
vealing on what specific grounds an employee had been dismissed as a
"security risk."' 35
129. Exec. Order No. 10450 § 8, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, 2491 (1953).
130. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1953, p. 1, col. 8.
131. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1954, p. 10, col. 3.
132. Ibid.
133. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1954, p. 1, col. 1.
134. Typical of these statements is that of Attorney General Brownell, who said, "One
thousand four hundred and fifty six persons have been ejected from the Government service
because they were found to be security risks.... We are going to have no more Communist
infiltration in the Government and we are steadily getting rid of those who are security risks.'"
N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1953, p. 11, col. 4. For the statement of Thomas Dewey, see N.Y.
Times, Dec. 17, 1954, p. 27, col. 4; for the statement of Leonard Hall, see N.Y. Times, Oct.
12, 1954, p. 21, col. 1.
135. Exec. Order No. 10450 § 9(c), 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, 2491 (1953).
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When the White House released the statement that 1,456 employees
had been dismissed under the security program, an inquisitive press began
to question the figure, and then began what has since been known as the
"numbers game." The demand for further information increased when
the President referred in his State of the Union address to the 2,200 em-
ployees who had already been dismissed or suspended.13" The Washing-
ton Press Corps began asking administration officials a number of ques-
tions: were these employees hired under the Truman or the Eisenhower
administrations? How many were security risks and how many were
loyalty risks? How many were fired and how many had resigned? Of
those who resigned, how many knew that their files contained derogatory
information? How many had been accorded a hearing? What were the
figures for each of the departments and agencies? How many had, in
fact, not left the government service but had transferred to other posi-
tions?
President Eisenhower at first refused to authorize an analysis of the
figures; he claimed that a breakdown could not be made."3 7 The press
rejected this position as untenable for it concluded that the raw informa-
tion which had served to make a finished compilation could also serve
to make an analysis and breakdown. It was the first time since the elec-
tion that the Eisenhower Administration had been confronted with a hos-
tile press. The President changed his mind.
On October 17, 1954, Philip Young, Presidential Advisor on Person-
nel Management and Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, an-
nounced that a breakdown would soon be forthcoming. He stated that:
• . . a classification according to the particular reasons for regarding
these individuals as security risks would be neither feasible nor in the
public interest. However, a classification according to broad categories
of information in the individual's files is feasible... There are many
criteria for determining the security reliability of employees. A person
not measuring up to those standards may have voluntarily resigned his
position or may have been discharged. In either case he is no longer on
136. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1954, p. 10, col. 3.
137. James Reston reported in the New York Times on January 28, 1954, that: "President
Eisenhower was visibly embarrassed at his news conference today by what is becoming almost
a weekly question: How about an explanation of the 2,200 security risks discharged by the
Government in the last year?
"For three months now the reporters, and more recently Congress, have been trying to
get the President to explain how many of these 2,200 were discharged as Communists, former
Communists or fellow travelers, and how many were ousted for lying, drinking or other char-
acter defects.
"At the start of this period the President referred the questioners to Herbert Brownell, Jr.,
the Attorney General, who referred them to Phillip Young, the head of the Civil Service
Commission, who referred them back to the White House. That is where they were this
morning.
"e are going around in circles, are we not, sir?' asked Robert L Riggs of the Louisville
Courier-Journal. The President smiled and said he didn't know whether there could ever be
the kind of breakdown the reporters wanted." N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1954, p. 14, col. 7.
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the Federal payroll in a job in which he might endanger the national
security... 138 (Emphasis added.)
This was the first official hint from the Civil Service Commission that,
included in the "released under the security program" figures, were at
least some who had left voluntarily.
At this point, the Democratic Party as the loyal opposition dealt itself
into the numbers game. As each of the heads of the various administra-
tive agencies appeared before the appropriations subcommittees for bud-
get hearings for his agency's funds, the Democratic members questioned
him about the breakdown. 9
From these Congressional hearings, with the press paving the way,
some interesting information was acquired. First, while some Republican
leaders had been using the statistics loosely so that security risk and sub-
versive seemed to be equated, the actual figures indicated that only a small
percentage of the total involved subversion. 4 ' Second, while the agency
heads reported the results for their individual agencies and the Civil Ser-
vice Commission presented the consolidated results, the Commission and
the individual agencies could not agree as to what the figures were.' 4 '
Mr. Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, kept
his promise to the press and presented a partial breakdown of the figures.
He reported that between May 27, 1953 (when the Eisenhower Execu-
tive Order went into effect) and December 31, 1953, a total of 2,727
employees either were dismissed or had resigned under the program ac-
cording to the following classification:'
Subversive information ----------------------------- 429
Sex perversion ----------------------------------- 207
Felonies and misdemeanors --------------------------- 636
Other ---------------------------------------- 1,455
Of these 2,727 dismissals or resignations there was derogatory informa-
tion in the personnel files of 2,486.'
It is suggested that a classification in which the largest category was
138. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1954, p. 14, col. 5.
139. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1954, p. 1, col. 2.
140. See Ibid.
141. For example, the State Department reported dismissals of 590 security risks of whom
11 were subversive while the Civil Service Commission reported 117 security risk cases for
the State Department of whom 43 were subversive. Hearings on Department of State and
United States Information Agency Appropriations for 1955 Before the Subcommittee on De-
partment of State, Justice, and Commerce of the House Committee on Appropriations, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 388, 405 (1945).
142. N.Y. Times, March 5, 1954, p. 1, col. 2; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the
Administration of the Federal Employees' Security Program of the Senate Committee on Post
Office and Civil Service, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, app. A, 973-1048 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as 1956 Senate Hearings].
143. See 1956 Senate Hearings, note 142 supra.
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a miscellaneous group, which was greater than all the other groups com-
bined, was not a very useful breakdown. Equally unsatisfactory was the
category entitled "subversive information" - employees whose person-
nel files contained "information indicating, in varying degrees, subversive
associations or membership in subversive organizations."' 44  Mr. Young,
was either unwilling or unable to provide the Committee with a more
detailed breakdown of the 429 employees in the "subversive" category.
He insisted that the 429 figure did not mean that 429 persons had been
separated for subversive activities, but rather, at the time of leaving the
government service, 429 persons had serious derogatory information of
a subversive nature in their personnel files.'45 Yet, he was unable to state
how many had been separated because of disloyalty and how many for
other reasons.'46 He could not state how many of the 429 had been dis-
charged and how many had resigned.4 7 He did not know how many of
those who resigned knew that their personnel files contained information
questioning their loyalty. 4' He did not know how many of the 429 had
been given a hearing.'49 He was unable to testify as to how many of the
429 had been hired by the Eisenhower Administration.' He did not
know if there were any Communists among them.' He did not know
if a single Communist had been prosecuted for falsely signing a job appli-
cation form.'
Furthermore, in his prepared opening statement to a Senate committee
on Post Office and Civil Service appropriations on March 10, 1954, Mr.
Young stated that: "The bulk of the terminations under the employee
security program has been effected through normal civil-service removal
procedures."'53 The import of this statement was not noticed by the Com-
mittee, and Mr. Young did not volunteer any further information. The
full implication of this point came up when Mr. Wilbur M. Brucker, gen-
eral counsel in charge of security of the Department of Defense, and Mr.
Fred Ayer, chief security officer for the Air Force, testified on March 9,
1955 at Senate hearings. Their testimony was to the effect that "a substan-
tial number" of those reported by the Civil Service Commission as separated
from the Defense Department as security risks were, in fact, discharged
144. Ibid.
145. 1956 Senate Hearings at 1019.
146. 1956 Senate Hearings at 1020.
147. 1956 Senate Hearings at 1015.
148. 1956 Senate Hearings at 1018.
149. Ibid.
150. 1956 Senate Hearings at 1021.
151. 1956 Senate Hearings at 1020.
152. 1956 Senate Hearings at 1010.
153. 1956 Senate Hearings at 1012.
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under normal Civil Service rules for "unsuitability" reasons.' In the
case of probationary employees, this was done summarily, without a hear-
ing. For those who were permanent employees in non-sensitive positions
(approximately two-thirds of the civilian employee positions were dassi-
fied non-sensitive) hearings, as required by Civil Service procedures, were
afforded. The choice of whether to separate under the security program
or regular civil service procedure was left to the discretion of the indi-
vidual security officers. The listing of all separations as security risks
was done at the order of the Civil Service Commission. Mr. Ayer was
quoted as saying during the lunch-time recess "that he would 'bet' as
many as 95 per cent of these [risk dismissals credited to his service] were
in this 'unsuitability' category.' "" This testimony before Senate commit-
tee hearings and the off-the-record remarks of Mr. Ayer suggest that the
security program separation figures were deliberately padded.
The Supreme Court and the Loyalty Program
Under President Eisenhower
Because Executive Order 10450 embraced Public Law 733, the order
likewise provided for the summary suspension of employees working in
eleven sensitive agencies when such procedures were deemed necessary
in the interests of national security. " ' Furthermore, under Executive Order
10450 President Eisenhower extended the summary procedure provisions
of Public Law 733 to all federal agencies so that, in effect, all of these
agencies were sensitive. In 1956 the Supreme Court of the United States
in Cole v. Young"'7 struck down this single standard and declared that a
distinction between "sensitive" and "non-sensitive" must be made as it had
been made under President Truman's loyalty program.
Cole, a veterans' preference eligible of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, was suspended without pay from his job in No-
vember, 1953, because of his "dose association with individuals reliably
reported to be Communists," and because of his attendance at meetings
of organizations proscribed by the Attorney General. " Cole declined
to answer these charges and thereafter he was dismissed by the head of
the department on the grounds that his continued employment was not
"clearly consistent with the interests of national security."'59  Cole at-
154. Hearings on the Commission of Government Security Before the Subcommittee on Re-
organization of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
159-62, 184-86, 233-24 (1955).
155. N.Y. Times, March 10, 1955, p. 1, col. 7.
156. Exec. Order No. 10450 § 1, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
157. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
158. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 535, 540 (1956).
159. Id. at 540.
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tempted to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, but his appeal was
denied on the ground that the Veterans' Preference Act,' under which
the appeal was sought, had been superseded by Public Law 733.161
Cole brought an action for a declaratory judgement in the District
Court of the District of Columbia. When the case finally reached the
Supreme Court, the majority opinion held that Public Law 733 applied
only to an employee whose position was such that his misconduct would
affect the national security as distinguished from an employee whose mis-
conduct might affect the general welfare. As no determination had been
made that Cole's position affected the national security, the Court held
his dismissal was not authorized by Public Law 733, and hence it was in
violation of the Veterans' Preference Act.'62 In other words, the Court
decided that Public Law 733 was applicable only to an employee whose
position was one affecting the national security, and that it was not ap-
plicable to an employee in a non-sensitive governmental position. The
term "sensitive" was construed so as to conform to the meaning of the
same word in the phrase, "sensitive agencies," as originally used in Public
Law 733 when there were only eleven such agencies in the Truman Ad-
ministration. "Sensitive Agencies," the Court said, referred to agencies
especially sensitive and vulnerable to subversive activities.
Public Law 733 was still to be applicable to all of the agencies through
Executive Order 10450, but its summary procedures could only be used
against employees within a given agency if they occupied positions whose
sensitivity was such as to affect the national security. Thus, the distinc-
tion between sensitive and non-sensitive positions established by Congress
during the Truman Administration, after the Supreme Court's decision,
continued to be valid under the Eisenhower program. Equally important,
a right to an appeal from a dismissal was no longer precluded under
10450 if the employee was working in a non-sensitive position and was
protected by some pre-existing statute or regulation.
This principle that a pre-existing statute or regulation could protect
an employee in a non-sensitive position was further amplified in Vitarelli
v. Seaton.' Vitarelli, a non-sensitive employee of the Department of
Interior whose employment rights were not protected by the Civil Service
Act or any other federal statute, was discharged from service in the in-
terests of national security after an administrative hearing. The Supreme
Court held that even though the Secretary of Interior could ordinarily
have discharged the employee summarily without giving reasons, because
160. 58 Star. 390, 5 U.S.C. 863 (1952).
161. Public Law 733, 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §§ 22-1 through 22-3 (1952).
162. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 535, 558 (1956).
163. 359U.S. 535 (1959).
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the employee had no protected employment rights, he could not do so in
this case. As Vitarelli was dismissed on security grounds, the Secretary
was bound, the Court said, to conform to departmental procedural rules
which had been specifically formulated for the dismissal of employees in
this type of case. The procedural rules of the Department of Interior
required specific charges to be made against the employee and granted
him the right to cross-examine witnesses. As these procedures were not
followed, the Court refused to uphold Vitarelli's dismissal. Thus, the
right to be faced with specific charges as well as the right to cross-examine
witnesses could not be denied by Executive Order 10450 to an employee
in a non-sensitive position provided an existing departmental regulation
set forth these procedural safeguards.
In the Cole and Vitarelli cases, the Supreme Court had protected fed-
eral employees in non-sensitive positions from the summary procedures
authorized by Executive Order 10450 and had guaranteed them certain
procedural rights (the right to specific charges, to confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses, and the right to appeal) when they were
otherwise entitled to these rights under existing law - statute or regula-
tion. In other words, the procedures set forth in pre-existing statutes and
regulations were to be followed in preference to those set forth in Execu-
tive Order 10450 with regard to employees working in non-sensitive po-
sitions. Executive Order 10450 was still controlling in the case of an
employee occupying a sensitive position regardless of the agency employ-
ing him.
Although the Cole and Vitarelli cases at first glance appeared to im-
pose substantial limitations upon the Eisenhower loyalty program and to
restore to the federal employee certain traditional procedural rights, it
must be remembered that the limitations that were imposed and the rights
that were restored did not involve the question of whether an employee
can or cannot be dismissed on any of the loyalty-security grounds pre-
scribed in Executive Order 10450. Rather the only question decided by
the Court was the extent that the summary procedures of Public Law 733
could be implemented through Executive Order 10450. It must also be
remembered that this protection did not emerge until some three years
after the implementation of the Executive Order and that an employee
whose position was now classified as "sensitive" by the government did
not share this immunity from the summary procedures. In Cole and
Vitarelli, the Supreme Court, as it had done more than ten years before
in United States v. Lovett,' avoided a controversy of broad political im-
port and based its decision on narrow legal grounds.
164. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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CONCLUSION
The task of a democracy in assuring the public that subversives are
not occupying key positions in the federal government and at the same
time in providing fair and equitable treatment for federal employees is
often burdensome and replete with dangers. What the present security
program tries to do is to predict possible future action based upon
the thoughts and associations of the past. If it were to be assumed,
arguendo, that such an approach is possible, even in the most favorable
political climate, grave civil liberty problems relating to the rights of the
employee are encountered. Such has been the case in the loyalty and
security programs of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.
Moreover, once partisan politics are introduced into this difficult area,
the rights of the employee are increasingly endangered, and the objectivity
and fairness of the entire program become open to question. While there
has been somewhat less political maneuvering in this area in the last five
years, the situation continues to remain potentially troublesome. The
legal rights of the federal employee have never been amply defined; the
constitutional issues, although raised, have never been resolved. In the
loyalty cases that have been considered, the Supreme Court has based its
decisions on narrow legal grounds. The road is still open for the un-
scrupulous politician and the overzealous administrator.
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